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NOTE
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
UNDER THE FOIA: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people who mean to be their
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which Knowledge
gives."'
— James Madison
The goal of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA" or "the Act")' is to protect the
public's right of access to government information." At the same time the FOIA recog-
nizes the need to balance this goal against the strong national interest in protecting certain
sensitive information. 4
 The Act provides that any person' should have access to iden-
tifiable, existing records" of a federal government agency' without having to demonstrate
a reason for his request." Nevertheless, the broad provisions for disclosure of government
Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF TAMES
MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,
110 - 111 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
• This accommodation has been recognised by Congress. See 111 CONG. REC. 52797 (daily ed. Feb.
17, 1965) (remarks of Senator Long) ("[O]ur purpose in introducing the [FOIAj is that a necessary
corollary to the right of a democratic people to participate in governmental affairs is the right to
acquire information."); 112 CONG. REC. H13641 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss)
("We must remove every barrier to information about — and understanding of — Government
activities consistent with our security. . . ."). See also Clark, Bolding Government Accountable: The
Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L. J. 741, 745 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Clark); S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1965).
• "The Committee has, with the utmost sense of responsibility, attempted to achieve a balance
between a public need to know and a necessary restraint upon access to information in specific
instances." 112 CONG. REC. H13641 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss). See also 1 R.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 5:8, at 329 (2d ecl. 1978) (discussing exemptions to general
disclosure rule); 112 CONG. REC. H 13645 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss) ("[The
FOIA] seeks to open all citizens, so far as consistent with other national goals of equal importance,
the broadest range of information."); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B).
• 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
7 5 U.S.C. § 552(e).
See 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 4-11 (1983) (hereinafter cited as
O'REILLY). Access to any person for any reason has created a policy problem in the area of civil
discovery which has troubled courts. Id. Litigants in actions against government agencies have
attempted to avoid roadblocks to discovery by requesting non-discoverable documents under the
FOIA. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978); NLRB v. Sears
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information do not apply to nine specific categories of information." These nine exemp-
tions represent Congress' recognition of the need to protect certain sensitive informa-
tion.'" The exemptions function, therefore, as a counterbalance to the Act's broad disclo-
sure provisions.
The successful operation of the FOIA depends upon the maintenance of the balance
between public and governmental interests." In order to effectuate the successful opera-
tion of the Act, Congress carefully created a system of checks and balances governing the
disclosure of. federal government. information under the FOIA. This system involves all
three branches of the federal government.
The role of the Congress is primarily one of definition. 12 The legislature defines the
types of information which are subject to the FOIA,'" the manner in which the FOIA is to
be administered," and the roles of the executive and judicial branches in this system."
Congress may also amend the Act if it detects problems in its operation." The executive
branch, through each of its departments, offices, and agencies, is responsible for the daily
administration of the Act." Each agency is required to determine whether a particular
piece of information must be disclosed pursuant to the FOIA's broad disclosure provi-
sions" or whether that information may be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to
one of the nine exemptions.'" Finally, the judiciary is responsible for the enforcement of
the FOIA.' The Act grants the federal courts substantial power to review executive
agency decisions and enjoin those that are improper. 27 If an executive agency decides to
withhold information and a citizen challenges the propriety of the agency's decision, the
federal courts are empowered to make a de novo determination of whether the agency
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 159-160 (1975); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491-492
(2d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145, 146-147 (1st Cir. 1976).
Further problems are expressed by government agencies in regard to national security informa-
non. Foreign individuals, including ambassadors, have rights equal to those of citizens under the
FOIA. 120 CONG. REC. 116806 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead). These rights
could be used regardless of the status of the requesting party. See Weinstein, Open Season on 'Open
Government', N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 78.
9
 The FOIA provides for nine categories of information which are exempt from disclosure. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text.
'" 112 CONG. REC. H 13641 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss).
" Id. at H13641-H13642.
' 9 1 O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 3-16.1.
1 " 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1)-(9).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(6),
Id.
1 " Amendment of the national security exemption which intrudes too far into the Executive's
domain, however, may create a separation of powers problem. See infra note 34.
See generally I O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 7-1 through 7-20.
5 U.S.G. § 552(a)(1),(2),(3),(5),(6).
19 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
9" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
91 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) empowers the Judiciary to conduct a de novo review of the propriety of
an agency's decision to withhold information. Id. This review of the documents which have been
claimed by the agency to be exempt from disclosure may include a complete examination of the
documents themselves and of the legal issues, without any judicial deference to the agency's prior
determination of exempt status. 1 O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 8-13. Commentators have praised
judicial de novo review because it removes questions of disclosure from the absolute discretion of
bureaucrats. Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLON]. L. REV. 895, 905
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Seven-Year Assessment).
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properly withheld the information and to order the disclosure of information that is
improperly withheld.""
Performance by each branch of its assigned role maintains the balance between the
public interest in disclosure and the governmental interest in the protection of informa-
tion. In cases involving the first of the Act's nine exemptions, the national security
exemption,'" however, the judiciary has expressed its reluctance to perform its assigned
role." The courts are rarely willing to review the executive agencies' decisions to withhold
information and enjoin those that are improper.'" As a result, in those national security
cases in which an agency's decision is improper, the judiciary's reluctance leaves the
public's right of access to government information inadequately protected.'"
Agencies may make improper decisions to withhold information in national security
cases for several reasons. First, the criteria which define "national security information"
are difficult to apply." Second, in a world of fluid political situations, the amount of
damage to national security which may result from the disclosure of a particular docu-
ment is sometimes impossible to predict." Finally, the consequences of an erroneous
decision to disclose may be disastrous: an ill-advised disclosure of sensitive information
could seriously threaten national security. Because of the uncertainties and risks atten-
dant upon the determination of whether to disclose certain information, agencies are
inclined to be exceedingly protective of any information, the disclosure of which may
even remotely threaten national security.'" In sonic cases, the protection of this informa-
tion may be improper under the FOI.A.""
The national security exemption possesses the potential for creating a further prob-
lem for the FOIA's system of maintaining a balance between public and governmental
interests, The FOIA provides that the criteria for the national security exemption be
established by the President in his Executive Order on National Security Information.'"
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(13) provides statutory authority for judicial review of FOIA claims. The
U.S. District Court in the district in which the complainant resides or has his principal place of
business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in t he District of' Columbia has jurisdiction.
Id. The court is empowered to make a de nova determination of the propriety of the agency's decision
to withhold records and order the production of any improperly withheld records. hi.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). See infra notes 215-290 and accompanying text.
" See Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The court is in no
position to second-guess ... the agency's determination of the need for classification... .[1 -he court]
must defer to the agency's evaluation of the need to maintain the secrecy of the [information].");
Halperin v. C.I.A., 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir, 1980) (Tillie court is not to conduct a detailed
inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency's opinions.. . . Judges, moreover, lack the
expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions.. ..").
See infra notes 215-290 and accompanying text.
See id.
'27 National security is concerned with potential dangers — with probabilities rather than con-
crete threats which are readily foreseeable and easily grasped. Executive Order on Security Classification,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Classification Hearings). The "national security" criterion is thus so
intrinsically vague and elastic that courts may have difficulty applying it to executive classification
decisions. See id. at 43-48; Note, National Security and the Amended FOIA, 75 YA I.E L.J. 401, 411 (1976)
(hereinafter cited as Yale Note).
See Yale Note, supra note 27, at 411 -412.
" I O'REILLY, supra note 8, at. 3-9 through 3-11.
" Alfred Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir. 1975). See also I O'REILLY, supra
note 8, at 3-9 through 3-11.
'I 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). For a discussion of Executive Orders, see infra notes 136-147 and
accompanying text.
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By empowering the executive branch to define the types of information which may be
protected under the FOIA's national security exemption and to amend the criteria at
wil1, 12
 Congress has eliminated a possible check against the executive's power to withhold
information. In the FOIA's eight other exemptions, Congress establishes the criteria for
exemption and thus defines the scope of the executive's power to protect information."
In the national security exemption, however, Congress vests total control in the executive
to define the scope of its power to protect information. The allocation of control over
national security matters to the executive conforms to the separation of powers doc-
trine."' Nevertheless, the elimination of' this check creates the potential for abuse by the
executive." For example, the President could establish criteria for exemption from the
FOIA which are so broad as to permit agencies to withhold any information they want,
regardless of the public interest in the disclosure of that information.'
As a result of the broad grant of power to the executive branch and the agencies'
tendency to overprotect. some information under the national security exemption, the
judiciary's role is especially important in national security GISCS. "7 I 11 order for the FO1A
to operate effectively in regard to national security information, the judiciary should
exercise its authority to make a de novo determination of the propriety of the agencies'
decisions to protect. information and to enjoin those that are improper." 8
Unfortunately, the courts have been reluctant to conduct a thorough de novo review
of the agencies' decisions to withhold information." The courts' reluctance reveals their
willingness to defer to the executive agencies." Such deference is a product of several
"' The President is empowered to make and issue such orders and instructions from time to
time as he may think necessary. 11 Stat. 60 (1856). It should be noted, however, that there is no
explicit congressional delegation of legislative power by Congress for the promulgation of Executive
Orders on national security information except to the extent that the 1974 Amendments of the FOIA
expressly incorporate the criteria of the Orders. in addition, it has long been contended that the
President requires no specific delegation because the power, specifically executive privileges, is
inherent in the President under the separation of powers doctrine, and because it is a necessary
concomitant of his power to make rules and regulations for the proper operation of the executive
branch of the federal government. MEZINES, STEIN, & GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.02, at 10-30
through 10-31.
:"' 5 U.S.C.	 552(h)(2)-(9).
The separation of powers doctrine gives the Executive authority over national security. See
infra note 341; Note, National Security and the Public Right to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the
FOIA, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1438, 1466-67 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Know). Congress
has been cautious in its considerations of amending the national security exemption. See Classcation
Hearings, supra note 27, at 20-21. Congress is unsure of the boundaries created by the separation of
powers doctrine, and it seeks to avoid a constitutional conflict. Id. The problems raised by Separation
of Powers concerns, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
'15 See infra text accompanying notes 156-204.
'" Id.
" 7 See infra notes 205-297 and accompanying text.
ax id.
"" See H.R. REP. No. 793, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) ("[Iln most instances the courts have
been reluctant to second guess the classifications imposed by the government.") See alto infra notes
205 -297 and accompanying text.
See Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1137 (D.C. Cit.. 1983) ("This court will not
... question the President's determination that the national security requires increased secrecy.");
Weissman v, C.I.A., 565 F.2d 692, 697 (B.G. Gir. 1977) ("Few judges have the skill or experience to
weigh the repercussions of disclosure of intelligence information.... [The court] need not ... test
the expertise of the agency or . , . test its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good
faith."); Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act — 1982, 1983 DUKE L. j . 390, 395
("courts generally defer to agency document classification under exemption (h)(1)").
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factors: the difficulty of deciding whether the disclosure of a document will endanger
national security; 41
 the judiciary's perceived lack of competence in matters of national
security;" and the executive's historical exercise of authority over matters of national
security and foreign policy. 43
Congress was aware of' these problems" and nevertheless determined that the
judiciary should be empowered to make the difficult determinations which are necessary
to the effective enforcement of the FOIA." As a result, the FOIA depends heavily upon
the courts' performance of their assigned role. The judiciary's failure to perform fully its
function creates serious problems for the successful operation of the FOIA.
This Note will explore the problems presented by the judiciary's failure to play its
proper role in the operation of the FOIA, It will focus on the special necessity of judicial
review of decisions by executive agencies to protect a particular document pursuant to the
FOIA's national security exemption. Finally, it will discuss recent developments affecting
the effectiveness of the FOIA in regard to national security information.
Section I" presents an overview of the Freedom of Information Act and introduces
the two provisions which are most relevant to the aforementioned problems, the national
security exemption" and the provision for judicial review." These provisions are then
fully examined in the two sections which follow. Section 11 49 analyzes the national security
exemption's broad grant of power to the executive branch 59
 and sets forth the problems
which the exercise of that power creates for the FOIA. 5 ' Section III 9' defines the scope
and purposes of the FOIA's provision for judicial review" and examines the courts'
4 ' See New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("The word
'security' is a broad, vague generality."); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(quoting Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))
(Decisions as to national security "are delicate, complex, and invoke large elements of prophesy.");
Yale Note, supra note 27, at 411.
" Salisbury v. U.S., 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Judges lack the expertise necessary to
second-guess such agency opinions."); Halperin v. C.I.A., 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he
court is not to conduct a detailed inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency's opinions.");
Bell v. U.S., 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1977) (standard of review does not allow court to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he
question of what is desirable in the interest of national defense ... is not the sort of question that
courts are designed to deal with.").
4' See Comment, FOIA: A Survey of Litigation Under the Exemptions, 48 Miss. L.J, 784, 787 (1977)
("Since these secrets were already protected from disclosure by the quasi-constitutional concept of
executive privilege, judicial interpretation has resulted in a diminution of Exemption One's effec-
tiveness."); Note, Right to Know, supra note 34 at 1466-1468.
" Hearings on 5.1 142 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2 at 108 (1974).
45 See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Staffs of Senate Committee on the Judiciary
and House Committee on Government Operations, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (Pub.
L. 93-502), Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents 183 (1974) (hereinafter cited as
Source Book); Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1449-1450.
" See infra notes 58 - 130 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 97-130 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 131-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-177 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 178-203 and accompanying text.
' 2 See infra notes 205 - 297 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 205-214 and accompanying text.
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reluctance to assume the responsibilities which Congress had given them."' Finally,
Section IV 55 examines the effects which the courts' deference has upon the FOLA in light
of recent developments"` and considers solutions to the resulting problems. 11 then
concludes that any solution requires the active enforcement of the FOIA by the court s. 57
I. THE FOIA: PROTECTION OF THE PUBLICS RIGHT
The FOIA ,was originally enacted in 1966" and was substantially strengthened by
amendment in 1974." The Act. embodies Congress' recognition of the need to establish a
statutory right of public access to government information." The Act is' based on the
assumption that any person"' should have access to identifiable, existing records"= of a
federal government agency" without having to demonstrate a need for the requested
information."' The thrust of the FOIA is to mandate responsible disclosure of govern-
ment information."'
The broad disclosure requirements of the FOIA are not unqualified. Rather, as
noted above, the Act attempts to achieve a balance between the public's right of access to
information and the legitimate needs of governmental secrecy"" by enumerating nine
categories of information which may he withheld in the interests of national security, the
privacy of individuals, or the effective operation of government."' Although the Act
specifies nine categories of information which may be protected from disclosure," these
exemptions do not require agencies to withhold records, but merely permit the protection
of information.""
" See infra notes 215-297 and accompanying text.
." See infra notes 300-351 and accompanying text.
"" See infra notes 300-332 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 333-351 and accompanying text.
" Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383.
'" Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). Two amendments in particular substantially
strengthened the Act. First, courts were empowered to conduct a discretionary in camera inspection
of disputed documents. See infra notes 241-264 and accompanying text. Second, in national security
cases, courts were granted the power to review the substantive propriety of the classification decision
as well as the procedural propriety. See infra notes 92-96 and acompanying text.
" 1 1 1 Conk. REC. 2797 (daily ed. Feb, 17, 1965) (remarks of Senator Long) ("[O]ut -
 purpose in
introducing the [FOIA] is that a necessary corollary to the right of a democratic people to participate
in governmental affairs is the right to acquire information."); 112 CONG. REC. 1-1 13641 (daily ed. June
20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss).




5 U.S.C. § 552(e).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
6' 1 R. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 329; 112 CONG. REC. El 13645 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of
Rep. Moss) ("[FOIA] seeks to open to all citizens, so far as consistent with other national goals of
equal importance, the broadest possible range of information."); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1965).
"" See supra note 4.
87 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
w Congress did not intend the exemptions in the FOLA to be used either to prohibit disclosure
of information or to justify automatic withholding of information. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in Source Rook, supra note 45, at 158. Rather, they ate only permissive. Id.
They merely mark the outer limits of information that may he withheld where the agency makes a
specific affirmative determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances dictate that
the information should be withheld. N.
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The FOIA is divided into five subsections. Subsection (a) is the heart of the Act. It sets
forth the types of information which shall be made available to the public," the manner in
which such information shall he made available," and the means by which requests for
information must he made.' 2 I t also outlines the scope and procedure of judicial review of
a decision to deny disclosure of requested information," and delineates the provisions for
disciplinary action against a government official who fails to comply with the Act."
Subsection (h) enumerates the nine categories of information which are exempt from the
disclosure provisions of the FOIA: national security information; government. personnel
rules; information specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute; trade secrets;
inter-agency memoranda; personnel files; investigatory records; reports related to the
regulation of financial institutions; and geological data concerning wells!' Subsection (c)
re-emphasizes the Act's overriding policy of responsible disclosure by specifically limiting
the scope of exemptions from disclosure to those categories enumerated in subsection
(b). 7" Subsection (d) requires agencies to make annual reports to Congress regarding their-
administration of the Act ." Subsection (e) describes the various governmental entities and
agencies that are subject to the provisions of the FOIA."
One of the more controversial provisions of the FOIA is the national security
exemption. '9 This exemption is the oldest and most well-established ground for withhold-
ing information." It has also been the one exemption most frequently criticized by
advocates of greater public access to government information." The national security
exemption presents two potential problems for the FOIA. First, because of the high
degree of uncertainty and risk attendant upon questions dealing with sensitive informa-
tion," the amount of government information which is protected may be excessive."
Second, by empowering the executive to establish the criteria for determining which
information shall he protected," the exemption alters the distribution of power among
the three branches found elsewhere in the FOIA and creates the possibility of abuse by
the executive."
The national security exemption provides that mandatory disclosure under the
FOIA does not apply to matters that are both: (a) specifically authorized under criteria
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(.0(1)-(4
71 a
72
 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). See infra notes 205-297 and accompanying text.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(c).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(d).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(e).
79 See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-84 (1973); .See generally
Hearings "Executive Privilege, etc." Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a Subcommit-
tee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) Vol. 1 (extensive hear-
ings on the national security exemption); Yale Note, supra note 27, at 403 n.20 (discussing compromise
draft on House and Senate versions).
" See I O'REILLr, .supra note 8, at 11-1.
81 Id. at 11-2.
82 See Yale Note, supra note 27, at 411.412.
"" Classification Hearings, .supra note 27, at 50-51 (testimony of Alan Adler and Morton Halperin);
id. at 16 (remarks of Rep. English).
" See infra notes 156-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Executive's exercise of
this power.
Hs Id.
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established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy; and (b) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order."
The exemption expressly vests in the executive the power to establish the criteria for
determining which information may be protected. As a result, the relevant Executive
Order on national security information is an integral part. of the national security exemp-
tion. 87 Discussion of Executive Orders is reserved, however, for Section II."
The present national security exemption is the result of a much-debated con-
gressional action" which, in 1974, amended the prior exemption. Overriding a Presiden-
tial veto," Congress voted to restrict the scope of executive privilege claims under the
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Prior to 1974, subsection (b)(1) exempted matters "specifically required
by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), Pub. L. 90-23 (1967).
See I O'REILL•, supra note 8, at 11-8.
" See infra notes 131-203 and accompanying text.
as
 An excellent compilation of the debate of the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA is found in
Source nook, supra note 45.
" See 120 CONG. REC. H36243-H36244 (1974) (veto message of President Ford). In vetoing the
amendment, President Ford contended that it seriously intruded upon the Executive's authority to
classify information in order to protect national security. Id. He felt that the decision to classify a
document and refuse disclosure may be exercised properly only by the executive branch because the
Constitution vests in the Executive the authority to conduct foreign relations and maintain the
national defense. See id. See also remarks of Senator 1-fruska, who supported the President's view
during debate over whether to override the veto. 120 CoNG. REC. S3682-S36873 (daily ed., Nov. 21,
1974).
Under the amended language of the exemption, however, the criteria used by an agency in a
decision to exempt materials remain those set forth in the prevailing Executive Order on National
Security Information. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(1) (1967) with U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982). Executive
Orders on National Security Information prescribe a uniform system for classifying, declassifying,
and safeguarding national security information. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 166
(1983). They are very explicit about what information shall be classified, how it shall be classified, and
who is authorized to make the decision. See infra notes 136-155 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Executive Orders in general, and see infra notes 180-203 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the present Executive Order, President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166
(1983).
The Judiciary is not empowered to review the propriety of the standards set forth in the
Executive Order. See 120 CoNG. REC. H6808 (daily ed., Mar. 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn). It
only reviews the agencies' application of those standards. See id.; Clark, supra note 3, at 758-59 (The
Judiciary is only empowered to require the executive agencies to comply with the standards.). The
Conference Committee said that this judicial check should prevent agencies from extending the
scope of the national security exemption beyond the limits established by the Executive Order. H.R.
REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). According to the District of Columbia Circuit, the
rationale for a cautious judicial review, which a de novo review can produce, was the congressional
intention that judicial review should be a safeguard against the potential that agencies could partially
undo the statutory boundaries on exempt status. Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
1980). If an agency could expand the class of exempt materials, and not have to fear careful review in
doing so, the court surmised that the exemptions could be quietly narrowed. Id.
The FOIA thus continues to vest broad power in the Executive to prescribe the standards and
procedures for the classification of national security information. Congress may limit the Executive's
power by amending the FOIA. See Classcation Hearings, supra note 27, at 20-21. The FOIA, as it
presently exists, however, does not provide for any statutory check on Executive power. For a
discussion of the Constitutional constraints on Congress' ability to limit Executive power in regard to
national security information, see Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1466 -67.
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FOI A 9 ' by adding the new requirement I hat the wit hheld information he "in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive Order." 92 Prior to the amendment, a court reviewing
a claim under the national security exemption was limited to a review of the procedural
propriety of the classification. 95 The courts were not empowered to determine whether
he classification was substantively proper." The amended language of the exemption,
however, expressly authorizes the courts to review the substantive as well as the pro-
cedural propriety of a classification decision."' The 1974 Amendments to t he FOIA thus
opened the issue of proper classification to an independent review by the judiciary.'"
Judicial review under t he FOIA is an integral part of the Act. Representative John D.
Moss, a sponsor of the original FOIA, has described the provision for judicial review of an
agency's refusal to disclose requested informations` as "by far the most important provi-
sion of [the FOIA]. It is this device that expands the rights of citizens and which protects
them against arbitrary or capricious denials [of access to government in formation]."" The
Act grants Federal District Courts "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from the withholding
of agency records improperly withheld from the complainant,' In such cases, Congress
explicitly provided that "t he court shall determine the matter de nom and the burden shall
be upon the agency to sustain its action."'"
9 ' Prior to the 1974 debates, the (b)(1) exemption had a simpler form. See supra note 86. This
form, as interpreted in several cases prior to the 1973 Supreme Court opinion in Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), allowed more latitude in withholding than the
presently defined criteria. See Wolfe v. Froelke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973) (The court
did not look beyond the procedural propriety of the agency's classification decision.); Epstein v.
Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 217 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (The standard applied was whether the classification
was "clearly arbitrary and unsupportable.").
" 1
 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(1).
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1974).
" Id.
'5 See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1974); S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2c1
Sess. 11- 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONC... & An. News 6273, 6273; Source Book, supra note
45, at 127. A court's review of the procedural propriety of a classification decision consists of merely
checking to see that the procedural rules of classification were obeyed and that the proper substan-
tive standards were applied. Id. A court's review of the agency's substantive decision, however,
consists of reviewing the correctness of the agency's application of these substantive standards. See 1
O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 11 - 6.
"6
 The courts are empowered to review an agency's application of Executive Order criteria even
if the review requires the court to weigh foreign affairs and national defense issues against citizen
rights. See 10'12E113.Y, supra note 8, at 11-6. Cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 601-602 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (warrant issuance may depend on national security considerations), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976). But see Weissman v. C.I.A., 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the court accorded
great deference to the agency, thus suggesting that although the court WaS empowered to act it was
perhaps not competent to do so. Weissman v. C.I.A., 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Weissman
has been followed by many other courts. See Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 171-172 (5th
Cir. 1978) (inquiry beyond the agency's affidavits would "require the court to . . . substitute its
judgment of the risk to national security for that of the agency."); Diviao v. Kelley, 571 F.2d 538, 542
(10th Cir. 1978) (Court applied rule set forth in Weissman .); Maroscia v. Levi. 569 F.2d 1000, 1003
(7th Cir. 1978) ("Our responsibility is not to 'test the expertise of the agency, or to question its
veracity where nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith' " (quoting Weissman, 565 F.2d at 697).);
Bell v. U.S., 563 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1977) (Court agrees with standard applied in Weissman.).
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
"" 112 CONG. REC. H 13641 (daily ed., June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss).
"" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
Itt(i
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The de novo review of an agency's decision to deny disclosure of requested informa-
tion proceeds in essentially three stages: 1) the court determines the legal criteria for the
exemptions claimed by the Government; 2) it determines the facts of the case; and 3) it
applies the legal criteria to the facts and determines whether the documents were properly
hheld under the claimed exemptions. [" t
As the first stage of review, there are few problems.' The prevailing Executive
Order clearly sets forth the relevant legal criteria for the national security exemption.'"
At the second stage, the court. determines all the relevant. facts.'" Such facts include the
nat ure of the withheld materials, 10 ' the purposes for which the documents were
created,'"6
 whether the proper classification procedures were followed,' and the possible
effects of disclosure upon national security.'"
Determination of the facts in national security cases presents special problems. A
significant problem is the difficulty of maintaining an adversarial proceeding.' Because
of t he alleged sensitivity of the disputed material, the "adversariness" of the proceeding is
necessarily limitecl.'") Disclosure of all the information which would be necessary to have a
truly adversarial proceeding is impossible."' To do so would he to enable the plaintiff to
acquire access to the information and thereby circumvent the requirements of the FOIA
by merely instituting a lawsuit.
Special procedures for gathering t he facts in these cases, however, have been devel-
oped in order to maintain as public and adversarial a proceeding as possible."' One of
these procedures requires the Government to submit public affidavits to assist the trial
court in conducting its de novo review."' These public affidavits describe the withheld
material and provide all evidence which may he relevant to each claimed exemption. "4 To
"' Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1214-1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright J., concurring).
L"' But see infra text accompanying notes 223-236.
im See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The present Executive Order is President Reagan's Exec. Order No.
12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). See infra notes 180-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
Executive Order.
1 "4 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (Wright j., concurring).
1 "5 In Phillipi v, C.I.A., 546 F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the nature of the requested
documents were such that the very acknowledgment of their existence, regardless of their content,
was shown to pose a threat to national security.
1" See, e.g., Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2(1 242, 253 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (The information at issue was communicated to or by an attorney in order to provide the
Air Force with legal advice. As such, it was protected by the attorney -client privilege.).
w' See Baez v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1332-1333 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Documents
classified after FOIA request was made were not properly classified under the allegedly relevant
Executive Order.); Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699. 704 - 707 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Documents classified at the time they were created were not classified properly under the relevant
criteria.).
"I" Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (Wright J., concurring). See supra note 41 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the difficulty of determining these effects.
LOS Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1212 (Wright J., concurring).
10 Id .
'" A true adversary proceeding would require that the requesting party have access to the
withheld materials. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). Such access would enable that
party to explain why the information must be disclosed. See id.
IS Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1212 (Wright J., concurring).
"" S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974); Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1210.1211 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
14
 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
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enhance the adversary process, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals requires these affidavits
to be as detailed as possible without revealing the information which is claimed to be
exempt."'
A further procedure available to the court is in camera inspection of the documents at
issue,'" in cases where the agency affidavits are not sufficiently specific, the court may
conduct an in camera inspection of the documents themselves."' The court's power to
inspect in camera, however, is discretionary, and not. limited to cases where the affidavits
are clearly insufficient.'" inspection in camera may be ordered as a result of "an uneasi-
ness, or a doubt [the judge] wants satisfied before he takes responsibility for a [de novo]
determination."' "9 Courts and commentators have stated t hat an in camera inspection is
often necessary in order to make a thorough and responsible determination of the
necessary facts. '='"
At the third stage of its de novo review, the court applies the legal criteria to the facts
and decides whether the agency's claim of exemption is proper.''' In making this deter-
mination, the court is charged with the responsibility of assuring the substantive, as well as
the procedural propriety of the classification.'" Further, the Government hears the
"5 The affidavits must meet well established standards of specificity in order for the court to
make a responsible de novo determination. They must show, with reasonable specificity, why the
information falls within the claimed exemption. Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381,
1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980). Affidavits will not suffice it they are
conclusory, merely recite the statutory standards, or are vague. Id. A detailed index and affidavit are
necessary even if the court conducts an in camera examination. Id. These public explanations of the
agency's action provide the plaintiff with at least some basis from which he can argue his position in
an adversarial proceeding. Id. These documents also provide assistance to the court by focusing on
the relevant issues and arguments. See Mead Data Central Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566
F.2d 242, 250-251, 260-262 (D.C. Cir, 1977); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-828 (D.C. Cir.
1973). The requirement of submitting public affidavits may be modified, but only under extreme
circumstances. See Phillipi v. C.I.A., 546 F.2d 1009, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1976) where affidavits were
submitted under seal for in camera inspection when the government alleged that official confirmation
of the mere existence of certain documents would endanger national security.
" 6 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright J., concurring). Employment of
these procedures is not limited to national security cases. They are applicable to all FOIA cases. Id.
' 17 In Camera inspection consists of a private examination of documents by the judge or a
quasijudicial special master. See generally R. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 3A.6-2
at 64-65 (1976) (hereinafter cited as R. Davis, Administrative Law); Note, In Camera Inspections Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 557, 558-561 (1974) (hereinafter cited as In Camera
Inspections).
Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1296-1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (courts have broad discretion to
employ in camera inspection); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The ultimate
criterion is simply this: whether the district judge believes that in camera inspection is needed in order
to make a responsible de novo determination.").
"9
 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Judge Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit
has identified several factors which, while in no way meant to minimize the broad discretion granted
to trial courts, should be considered by the court in the exercise of that discretion: judicial economy;
bad faith on theyart of the agency; the nature of the dispute; the public interest in disclosure. Allen
v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
' 20 See S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2c1 Sess. 9 (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 6287; Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright J., concurring); Allen v.
C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
' 2 ' Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
'" See supra notes'92-96 and accompanying text.
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burden of proving that the withheld documents are exempt.'=' This allocation of the
burden of proof favors the party seeking disclosure because the res of the suit, the
document, is in the exclusive possession of the agency.' As the initial Senate Report
stated in 1965, the burden rests with the Government because it is the only party with
enough information to explain why the information was withheld. 12:5 If the Government.
fails to meet its burden of proving that the requested material is exempt, the information
must he released.'"
The overriding policy of t he RNA is to disclose whenever possible and to withhold
only when necessary.'" This policy is a response to what Congress has perceived to he the
excessive classification practices of government agencies.'" The Act embodies Congress'
recognition of the need to protect. the public's right of access to government. informa-
tion."' It also recognizes the legitimate government interest in secrecy for reasons of
national security but seeks to safeguard this interest without sacrificing the public's
interest in open government.'"
Having introduced the national security exemption and the provisions for judicial
review, this Note will now examine each in greater detail. Section 11 will analyze the
national security exemption's broad grant of power to the executive and the executive's
exercise of that power through Executive Orders. After a discussion of Executive Orders
in general, this section will focus upon the current Executive Order, President Reagan's
E.O. 12356, and describe its effect upon the public's rights under the FOIA.
11. THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The executive branch plays two roles in the operation of the FOI A's national security
exemption. First, executive agencies regularly determine whether a particular document
roust be disclosed or whet her it fits into one of the exempt. categories and can therefOre be
protected," Second, the President establishes the criteria to he used by the agencies itt
classifying national security information."' An understanding of the executive's second
role is necessary to a discussion of the particular problems created by the national security
exemption.
As noted in Section I,'" the prevailing Executive Order on National Security In for-
The FOIA places the burden of proof upon the agency "to sustain its action" of withholding
information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(13). Some courts will shift the burden to the requester. See Ray E.
Friedman & Co. v. C.F.T.C., No. 80-C-6389 (N.D. III. 1982). Once the exemption is shown to apply,
the plaintiff may be compelled to go forward with contrary affidavits which impeach the declarations
of the government's affiants. Id.
1 ' 1 I O'REil.t.v,supw note 8, at 8-36. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
1 O'REILLy, supra none 8, at 8-37.
'' See Source Book, supra note 45, at 250; Davis v. C.I.A., 711 F.2c1 858, 861 (8th Cir. 1983)
(goofing Kuehnert v, F.B.I., 620 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1980)).
11' See Source Book, supra note 45, at 257 (remarks of Rep. Moss); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187,
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
12" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
• "" See Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1473.
I ' See generally 1 014.11.1.v,suprez note 8, at Ch. 7; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. V.A., 301 F.
Supp. 796, 799-800 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) (1982) defines the criteria for the national security exemption as those
prescribed by Executive Order.
"" See supra notes 58-130 and accompanying text.
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mation sets forth the criteria for determining whether a document has been properly
withheld under the FOIA's national security exemption." - ' Consequently, a detailed
analysis of Executive Orders in general and the present Executive Order, President
Reagan's E.O. 12356,°' is vital to a discussion of the national security exemption. The
results of this analysis can then be examined in terms of their effect on the FO I A.
An Executive Order is a formal directive issued by the President in which he
prescribes such regulations and instructions as he may feel are conducive to the public
interest.''" This form of presidential communication is used in many different contexts.°"
Since 1940, Presidents have used Executive Orders to promulgate the procedures and
criteria for classifying sensitive information.' Although the specific structure and proce-
dure of Executive Orders on National Security Information vary, they generally prescribe
standards for three or four levels of classification,'" designate which government officials
are authorized to classify information at each level,"° and enumerate several broad
categories of information which shall be considered for classification."'
When a document is created, it is reviewed by an official with classification authority.
That official determines whether it must be classified pursuant to the Executive Order.j 4 "
The manner of this review varies from Order to Order, depending upon the procedures
prescribed by each. In recent Orders, however, the review has been conducted in two
"4 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). These orders prescribe a uniform system for classifying, declassify-
ing, and safeguarding national security information. Exec. Order No, 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
They are very explicit about what information shall be classified, how it shall he classified, and who is
authori -zed to make the decision. See, e.g., id.
Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) (effective Aug. I, 1982).
144
 I I Stat. 60 (1856).
t`' Ehlke and Relyea, The Reagan Administration Order on Securily Classification: A Critical Assess-
ment, 30 Ft.D. BAR. N & j 91, 91 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Assessment).
1.0 Id. at 92. Since President Roosevelt issued Exec. Order No. 8381 in 1940, Presidents Truman
(Exec. Order No.'s 10,104 and 10,290), Eisenhower (Exec. Order No. 10,501), Nixon (Exec. Order
No. 11,652), Carter (Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978)), and Reagan (Exec. Order
No. 12,356, '3 C.F.R. 166 (1983)) have issued Orders on national security information.
For example: Top Secret (information which "reasonably could he expected to cause excep-
tionally grave danger to the national security"); Secret ("serious damage''); Confidential ("damage").
Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(a)(1), (2), and (3), 3 C.F.R. at 167 (1983).
14" Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.2, 3 C.F.R, at 167-168 (1983).
14 ' Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3 states:
(a) Information shall be considered for classification if it concerns:
(I) military plans, weapons, or operations;
(2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans
relating to I he national security;
(3) foreign government information;
(4) intelligence activities .. . , or intelligence sources or methods;
(5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
(6) scientific, technological, or economic matters fairing to the national se-
curity;
(7) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities;
(8) cryptology;
(9) a confidential source; or
(10) other categories of information that are related to the national security ...
as determined by the [executive branch].
3 C.F.R. at 168-169 '(1983).
142 See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby. 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir. 1975).
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steps.'" First, the official must determine whether the information concerns one of the
enumerated categories. "4 If the information does fit into one of those broad categories, it
shall be considered for classification.'" The official must then, at the second step, deter-
mine whether the information meets the minimum standard of classification."' If the
document meets the standard, it must be classified.' All that remains to be determined is
the appropriate level of classification.
The structure, scope, and procedure of Executive Orders have varied over the
years.'" At first, they only concerned the security of military information.' Gradually,
however, they came to classify information "in the interest of national security." 459 It. has
been noted that this imprecise term, "national security," allows considerable latitude for
the creation of secrets.'' Classified information is no longer limited to traditional military
or national defense matters.'" Until recently, however, successive orders had gradually
restricted the criteria and procedures for classifying government agency records.' Each
successive Executive Order had become more cognizant of the Government's tendency to
over-classify government information, 134 and a trend of providing for more disclosure
developed.' 55
In the midst of this growing trend of increased disclosure of government informa-
tion, t he FOIA was enacted." In light of this trend, Congress possibly did not expect that
"" See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950-28, 951 (1978) (President Carter's
Order); Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.E.R. 166, 166-169 (1983) (President Reagan's Order).
194 Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.E.R. 166, 168-169 (1983).
145 Id.
14" An example of such a standard would be whether disclosure of the information reasonably
could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Exec. Order No. 12,356 Preamble, § 1.1
(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 166, 166-167 (1983).
'" Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). Under the previous Executive Order, classifica-
tion was permissive, not mandatory. See Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-301, 43 Fed, Reg. 28,949, 28,951
(1978).
See Assessment, supra note 137, at 92-94.
149 Id. at 92.
1 " Id.
Id.; Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 11-12, 43-48 (testimony of Prof. Cheh).
'" Assessment, supra note 137, at 92.
1 " Id. at 94.
1" There is almost unanimous agreement on the existence of classification abuse. President
Nixon stated that:
the system of classification which has evolved in the United States has failed to meet the
standards of an open and democratic society, allowing too many papers to be classified
for too long a time. . . . classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic
mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations.
8 WEEKLY COMA. PRES. DOC. 543 (1972). See also Classcation Hearings, supra note 27, at 16 (remarks
of Rep. English); Renegotiation Board v. Ban nercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 1).5. 1, 34 (1974) (Doug-
las, J., Dissenting) ("it has been shown innumerable times that information is often withheld to cover
up embarrassing mistakes. . ..“); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 120 Cone.
REc. 39316 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); Classification Hearings, supra note 27,
at 51 (In his testimony, Mr. Halperin slates: "we have in the library of the Center for National
Security Studies, file cabinet after file cabinet of documents where the classification stamps have been
crossed out and the Government has released the material."); Assessment, supra note 137, at 94.
1 " See Assessment, supra note 137, at 94; Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 3 (testimony of
Professor Cheh).
See .supra note 59.
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the unchecked power which the national security exemption vested in the executive
branch would he used to restrict the public's access to government information.'" Al-
though the executive agencies still tended to over-classify,'" the criteria of the Executive
Orders during this period favored increased disclosure.' 59 In fact, in 1978, President.
Carter promulgated the most disclosure-oriented Executive Order ever. 16"
President Carter's E.O. 12065 contained several Provisions which favored the disclo-
sure of as much information as possible. The most. significant provision was its general
statement of policy, which stated that any substantial doubt should he resolved in favor of
disclosure.'" This policy of limiting the amount of classified information to only that
which clearly threatened national security was carried out by two important provisions.
First, E.O. 12065 tightened the standards for classification by allowing classification only if
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause "at least identifiable damage to national
securit y." 162
 The inclusion of the "identifiable" qualifier limited the agencies' discretion to
classify information by requiring them to present specific justification for their decisions
to classify.''" Prior to E.O. 12065, information •was classified in the interest of national
security. t'9
 of the nebulous term, "national security," allowed considerable latitude in
the creation of secrets.'" 5 Any withholding of information under this standard was fairly
easy to justify. ["" E.O. 12065 limited the agencies' discretion in using the term, "national
security," by requiring the agency to identify the specific nature of the harm that the
disclosure of the information would cause.'"
The second provision of E.O. 12065 which favored the disclosure of as much
information as possible was the so-called "balancing test."' This test was part of E.O.
12065's declassification procedure.'" Pursuant to this procedure, information which had
previously been classified was subject to mandatory review to determine whether it should
continue to be protected."' Information which no longer satisfied the criteria of the
Order was declassified, but more significantly, the "balancing test" required the de-
classification of some information that still satisfied the standards for classification."'
When information was reviewed and found to satisfy the criteria for classification, the
reviewing official was required to further determine whether the public interest in
disclosure outweighed the Government's interest in prohibiting disclosure of the docu-
See 120 CONG. REC. H6809 (daily ed., Mar. 14, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Young), reprinted in
Source Book, supra note 45, at 250 (noting that President Nixon had taken steps to correct the problem
of over -classification); 120 CONG. REC. 59310 (daily ed., May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits),
reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 311 (noting the overall movement of government towards
declassification).
I" See supra note 154.
See Assessment, supra note 137, at 93.
' 6° Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978).
" 1 Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-101, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (1978).
"' Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-302, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,951 (1978).
16' Assessment, supra note 137, at 93. No court, however, has focused on the presence of the
qualifier as adding significantly to the burden on an agency to demonstrate classifiability of materials.
See id. at 96; Classification Hearings „supra note 27, at 75. But see infra note 340 and accompanying text.
1 " Assessment, supra note 137, at 93.
'" See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
"' Id.
"" See Assessment, supra note 137, at 93.
Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 3-303, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,955 (1978).
1" Id.
1711
' 7 ' Id.




 If the public's interest outweighed the Government's, the document was de-
classified.' This provision resulted in the disclosure of many documents which would
have otherwise remained classified,' and through this provision, E.O. 12065 actively
promoted the disclosure-oriented policies of the FO1A."• President Carter used his
extensive power to establish the criteria of the national security exemption to further the
purposes of the EOM.'" Although the executive agencies still tended to over-classify
information,'" the balance sought to he maintained by the FOIA did not appear to be
seriously threatened.
The presently effect ive Executive Order, President. Reagan's E.O. 12356,'" however,
does threaten the balance sought. to be maintained by the _EOM.'" According to several
authorities, E.O. 12356 clearly reverses the trend toward providing for more disclo-
sure.'" Comparison to its predecessors reveals that E.O. 12356 is the most classification-
oriented Order since the FOIA was enacted."' It places heavy emphasis on the need for
the protection of information over the public's need for access to government records.'"
Although E.O. 12356's preamble professes that "it is essential that the public be
informed concerning t he activities of its Government,"' 83 its overwhelming message is to
classify whenever possible.'" This overriding policy of increased classification is best
illustrated by the present Order's provision for ca ses where there is doubt about whether
a document should be classified. E.O. 12356 provides that when there is a "reasonable
doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were
classified.''' This language marks a radical departure from the language of the preced-
ing Executive Order, E.O. 12065, which provided that any "substantial" doubt. should be
resolved in favor of disclosure."" The basic policy of E.O. 12356 as evidenced by the
language of this section is thus in direct contradiction with that of its predecessor, E.O.
12065.
Other features of President. Reagan's Order reveal this same dramatic reversal in
policy concerning public access to government information. First, E.O. 12356 revokes
various restraints on classification criteria and discretion which had evolved from previ-
172 Id.
17:i Id.
" Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 51.
' a Exec. Order No. 12,065 Preamble, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,949 (1978).
IN Id.
See supra note 154.
1 " Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
See 128 CONG. REC. S4211 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger) (The
Order "will increase secrecy far beyond what experience has taught us is needed to protect the
security of our country."); Id. at 54213 (remarks of Sen. Fluddleston) (commenting on the serious
danger of overclassification and excessive secrecy created by Executive Order 12356); Boston Globe,
Jan. 24, 1984, at 16, col. 1 (quoting a veteran information act officer at a major federal agency who
declined to he identified: "The Administration came in t•emasculate the Freedom of Information
Act.").
T 8" Assessment, supra note 137, at 94; Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 66.
1 " For an in-depth comparison of Executive Orders 12356 and 12065, see 128 CONG. REC.
54211-16 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (proposal of 5.2452 "Freedom of Information Protection Act");
Assessment, supra note 137, at 94; Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 66.
'2 See Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 3 -4.
"' Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166, 166 (1983).
Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 50.
"5
 Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 137 (1983).
1 " Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-101, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (1978).
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ous executive orders."' Most significant is its elimination of the "identifiable" qualifier
from the basic standard for classifying information found in E.O. 12065. 1 " In order for a
document to be classified under the Reagan Order, there need only be a showing [hat its
disclosure "[could] reasonably ... be expected to cause damage to national security."'"
The Carter Order required that disclosure of a document be reasonably expected to cause
"at least identifiable damage to national security."' (emphasis added). The result of this
change in language is to offer almost unlimited discretion to the classifier.' Virtually any
document that falls within one of the enumerated categories' 92 could conceivably he
expected to cause damage, however abstract or theoretical.' 9' Under the Reagan Order,
therefore, authorized personnel may effectively classify a document without really mak-
ing a thoughtful determination of specific damage. '`"
E.O. 12356 also creates three new categories of information which shall he consid-
ered for classification.' This new provision, like the others noted above, promotes t he
classification of more information. Prior to E.O. 12356, the Government, according to one
authority, had never complained that it was unable to classify sensitive information
because any or all of the enumerated categories were drawn too narrowly to encompass
that particular informal ion.' 9' Further, no FOIA case has turned on the question of
whether or not particular information was properly determined to fit into one of the
categories. 107 The new categories, therefore, represent an invitation to the agencies to
classify types of information which they perhaps had not considered classifying previ-
ously.' 9"
1 '37 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) with Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed.
Reg. 28,949 (1978) and Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 Comp.), reprinted in 1972
U.S. Cone CONG. & An. News 5513 (1972).
'" Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-302 provided that information "may not he classified unless an
original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be
expected to cause at least identifiabli damage to the national security." Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43
Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,951 (1978) (emphasis added).
1 " Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983).
' Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-302, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,951 (197H).
' 9 ' See supra note 151.
Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(a)(1) -(10), 3 C.F.R. 166, 168- 169. See supra note 141.
Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 4 (testimony of Prof.
'" Id.
The three new categories include information concerning "the vulnerabilities or capabilities
of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to national security," "cryptology," and "a
confidential source." Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(a), 3 C.E.R. 166, 168-169 (1983).
Exec. Order No. 12,356 also extends a presumption of classification to include "intelligence
sources or methods," as well as foreign government information. Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(c).
The effect of this new presumption is to provide essentially blanket protection to the CIA. Classifica-
tion Hearings, supra note 27, at 77. The Reagan Administration sought to obtain Congressional
approval of a proposal to exempt totally the CIA from the provisions of the FOIA (even though the
agency won every case in which it sought to withhold information), but Congress refused to adopt
this proposal. See Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 23. The new presumption in favor of classifying intelligence sources and methods
essentially accomplishes what the proposed amendment sought to accomplish. Id.
' 9' Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 75.
1 " Id.
I" Id. The House Subcommittee which conducted hearings on the proposed Exec. Order No.
12,356 was puzzled as to why President Reagan sought to expand the categories of classifiable
information. See Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 16. Unfortunately. the Reagan Administra-
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Finally, E.O. 12356 eliminates from the previous Order several significant de-
classification procedures so that many records may now remain classified indefinitely.'"
Some of the discarded procedures provided for mandatory review of a document's
classification after a certain number of years. 2" In addition, E.O. 12356 revokes E.O.
12065's balancing lest, thus no longer requiring agency officials who review information
for declassification to consider the public's interest in disclosure. 2°' These officials merely
apply the standards for classification; if the information satisfies the standard, it remains
classified. Despite its express recognition of the need for disclosure, 212
 none of the
operative provisions of E.O. 12356 seem to recognize the public's right of access to
government. records. 2"
Because the national security exemption vests full power in the executive to prescribe
the criteria for exemption, President Reagan's E.O. 12356 is valid under the provisions of
the FO1A. This Order, however, may pose a threat to the successful operation of the
FOIA regarding national security information which did not exist under E.O. 12065.
E.O. 12356's failure to acknowledge the public's right of access to government informa-
tion may disrupt the balance between the public interest in disclosure and the governmen-
tal interest in the protection of information.
The judiciary's performance of its role under the FO1A, however, should restore the
balance or, at least, diminish the adverse effect which E.O. 12356 may have upon the
operation of the FO1A. The Act empowers the federal courts to conduct a de novo review
of agency classification decisions and enjoin those that are improper. The next section 204
defines the scope and purposes of the FOIA's provisions for judicial review and examines
the judiciary's reluctance to assume the responsibilities which Congress has given it.
III. THE COURTS: INEFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FOIA
The courts, as noted in Section 1, 205
 have been given an especially significant role to
play in ensuring the effective operation of the FOIA. In all cases in which an executive
agency withholds a document under one of the exemptions, the court has the power to
conduct a de novo review of the agency's decision. 2" In national security cases, the de novo
review of an agency's decision to withhold a document necessarily becomes a review of the
lion failed to send a representative to the hearings to discuss its intentions. Id. at 2-3, 16. Any possible
justifications for the expansion would therefore he mere speculation. See also 128 Com:. REC. S4213
(daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan) (commenting upon the Administration's
inadequate explanation for its decision to drop the balancing test and the "identifiable" qualifier
from E.O. 12356),
14'" Id. at 50.
'' Exec. Order No. 12,065 §§ 3-4 through 3-6, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,956-28,957 (1978).
2111
 Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 3-303 provided that "in some cases . . . the need to protect
[classified] information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and
in these cases, the information should be declassified," Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949,
28,955 (1978). Exec. Order No. 12,356 has no comparable provision.
'"' See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
21' See Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 80. Because the Reagan Administration has not
accepted Congress' invitation to discuss E.O. 12356, any possible justifications for discarding the
balancing test would be mere speculation. See supra note 198.
2"' See infra notes 205-297 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 58-130 and accompanying text.
2I0 5 U.S.C.	 552(a)(4)(R)•
May 1984]	 SECURITY  INFORMATION DISCLOSURE	 629
agency's decision to classify that document."' If the court determines that the classifica-
tion and subsequent withholding are improper, it has the power to enjoin the agency
from withholding the document from t he party seeking disclosure.'"
The court's role under I he FOIA has been described as one of expanding the rights
of citizens and protecting them against arbitrary or capricious denials of access to gov-
ernment information.'" De novo review of a government agency's classification decision
provides a meaningful opportunity for a citizen to challenge it classification decision and
forces the classifying agency to justify its decision before a neutral arbiter. 21 ° The FOIA's
provisions for judicial review thus provide a means for maintaining a balance between the
public's interest in disclosure and the government's interest in protecting certain sensitive
information. Because Congress recognized that executive agencies tended to over-use
classification stamps,2 t 1 the FO1A empowers the courts to review classification decisions,
substantively as well as procedurally, 212 and requires the agencies to satisfy the courts that
their decisions are proper.' The judiciary's proper exercise of these powers should
reduce agency abuse of classification stamps and reverse improper classification decisions
in favor of the party requesting disclosure.'"
Despite the judiciary's broad powers to review the propriety of classification decisions
and enjoin those it finds to he improper, classified records have rarely been disclosed to
the public as a result of FOIA litigation."'' In the nine years since the 1974 Amendments
to the FOIA, the courts have seldom questioned the classification decisions of government.
officials."" In fact, one authority has noted that he knew of only four very short and
xk1 ' The criteria for the exemption ate the same as those for classification. Both are set forth in
the relevant Executive Order. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356 ** 1.1, 1.3, 3 C.F.R. 166, 166-169
(1983).
'2" 5 U.S.C.	 552(a)(4)(B).
2 "" See Seven-Year Assessment, .supra note 21, at 905.
2 th The statutory requirement that review be de novo is intended to "prevent it from becoming
meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1965).
2 " See 128 Com:. REC. 5421 I (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston) (comment-
ing upon the "natural desire of all bureaucrats for secrecy"). it is widely acknowledged that the
classification stamp is overused. See supra note 154. Indeed, even Edwin Meese, White House
Counselor of the Reagan Administration, acknowledged in a national press interview that "there is
way too much classification." Assessment, .supra note 137, at 94.
21.' See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
' 11 ' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) places the burden on t he agency to sustain its action. See supra notes
123-126 and accompanying text.
214 See S. REP. NO. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 182.
215 See 128 CONe. REC. S4211 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger) ("judges
.. have almost always [allowed] the Government to withhold information that it says should be kept
secret"). Two district courts, however, have enjoined improper classification decisions and ordered
the release of the documents in dispute. The Court of Appeals in Holy Spirit Ass'n v. C.I.A., 636
F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1980) affirmed a district court decision which ordered the release of
assertedly classified information, but that judgment was stayed by the Supreme Court and ultimately
vacated as moot when the requesters withdrew their request for the classified documents. C.I.A. v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 1626 (1982). The court in Jaffe v. C.I.A. quoted portions of classified
documents in the course of its discussion of what it viewed as inconsistent classification decisions by
the agency. Jaffe v. C.I.A., 516 F. Supp, 576, 581-583 (D.D.C. 1981). Other district courts have
ordered the release of classified information, but these orders have not survived either reconsidera-
tion or appellate review. See, e.g., Weberman v. National Security Agency, 490 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), reversed, 646 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1980), an remand, 507 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affirmed,
668 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1982).
218 Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 50.
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innocuous sentences which the courts have ordered released, after rejecting the govern-
ment's claim that they were properly classified:217 Analysis of the courts' response to the
FOI A's broad gram of power reveals that this result is a product of both the judiciary's
reluctance to exercise its power and its utmost deference to the executive branch.
The process of a de novo review under the FOIA which was explained in Section I'
provides a useful framework for analysis of the court's reluctance to perform its assigned
role under the FOIA. The judiciary's de novo review proceeds in three stages: 1) determin-
ing the proper legal criteria to be applied; 2) finding the relevant facts of the case, and; 3)
applying the proper criteria to the fact s, 219 At each of these three stages, courts have been
deferential to the executive branch.
The courts' determination at the first stage of de WW1) rev	 offers little room for
the exercise of discretion because the legal criteria for the national security exemption are
clearly set Ibrth in i he relevant Executive Order.' Only rarely does a reviewing court's
determination of the proper legal criteria affect its decision to overrule or sustain the
agency's classification decision. 222 Recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals confronted
this issue"' and that court's decision illustrates the judiciary's deference to executive
classification decisions.
In Afv/utr v. Deparlrnen1 of Stole,'" the plaintiff' submitted requests under the FOIA to
several agencies for all documents pertaining to him or his activities in opposition to the
Shah of I ran. 225
 The agencies withheld a number of the requested documents and failed
to respond to the plaintiff's appeals."" The plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the
withholding of the requested documents, and the district court granted the Government's
motion for summary judgment. 227
 The appellant raised several issues on appeal, includ-
ing a question of the lower court's refusal to apply E.O. I 2065's balancing test."' After
Id.
21" See supra notes 101-122 and accompanying text.
21 ' Ray v. Turner, 587 F,2(1 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
22"See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
221 Id,
222 The only time there is any question of the proper legal criteria is when a new Executive
Order supercedes a prior order, especially during the pendency of an FOIA action. See Afshar v.
Department of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Executive Order 12356 superceded
Executive Order 12065 after oral argument on appeal); Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d
1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Executive Order 12065 superceded Executive Order 11652 while case
pending before district court); Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Executive Order 12065 superceded Executive Order 11652 after district court had decided the
case); Fulbright and Jaworski v. Department of the Treasury, 545 F. Supp. 615, 619 (D.D.C. 1982)
(Document originally classified under Executive Order 11652. Plaintiff brought suit to require
agency to review the classification under Executive Order 12065, which had just become effective.);
Laroche v. Kelly, 522 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Executive Order 12065 superceded
Executive Order 11652 during pendency of district court trial).
227 Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2(1 1125, 1135 (D,C. Cir. 1983).
224
 702 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2" Id. at 1128.
226 Id .
227 Id.
225 See supra notes 168-176 and accompanying text. The appellant, Afshar, raised three other
issues: 1) whether the FOIA allows government agencies to withhold information under exemptions
1 and 3 where there have been prior disclosures of similar information; 2) whether information can
be withheld under exemption 3 of the FOIA if it is not properly classified under exemption 1; and 3)
whether certain memoranda recommending agency action can be withheld•under exemption 5 if the
recommendations were actually adopted as the basis for agency action. Afshar v. Department of
State, 702 F.2d at 1127.
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oral argument on appeal, E.O. 12356 became effective and superceded E.O. 12065. 229 In
order to address the question regarding the balancing test, the appellate court had to
determine which of the two competing Executive Orders would be used to assess the
propriety of the agency's decision to classify information.'"' The court held that where the
executive had determined that national security requires increased secrecy and had
issued an Executive Order to that effect, the court, in its review of the classification of
documents claimed to be exempt under the national security exemption, shall apply the
criteria of the Executive Order in force at the time of the court's decision.' t
Three years prior to Afshar, the D.C. Circuit ruled, on essentially identical facts, that
"a reviewing court should assess classification under the Executive Order in force at the
tin-te the responsible official finally acts." 232 The court's holding in Afshar, that the relevant
order is the one which is currently effective, is in direct conflict with this well-established
precedent. 2 't Indeed, the Afshar court itself recognized that it was departing from prece-
dent.'" The court, however, supported its departure by concluding that "the evident
national interest in allowing the President to respond quickly to shifts in the need for
secrecy must take precedence." 215 The Afshar court thus did not hesitate to base its
decision upon the deference that it felt due the executive in matters of national secu-
rity. 2" 6.
Evidence of the judiciary's deference to the executive may also be derived from its
determinations at the second stage of review.'" In national security cases, one of the most
important issues which the court must resolve at this stage is whether the agency's
affidavits are sufficiently detailed and complete to enable the court to make a de novo
determination. 2"8 Sometimes the public affidavits are sufficient, but as Judge Skelly
Wright has noted, the agencies often fail to satisfy this requirement.' ` 9 If the court is not
satisfied with the affidavits, it can order an in camera examination of the documents. 24°
229
	
lower court's review of the plaintiff's FOIA claim was conducted under Executive Order
No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978). Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d at 1135.
230 Afshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d at 1135.
23 ' Id. at 1137.
232 Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2" For cases following the precedent established by Lesar, see supra note 222 and cases cited
therein.
2" 702 F.2(1 at 1138 n.18. ("To the extent that the decision in this case gives present effect to
that provision of Executive Order No. 12,356 that revoked the balancing provision of Executive
Order No. 12,065, it limits the broad statement [on Lesar.").
"S Id. at 1137. The court said that it did not think its holding dramatically undermined Lesar
because it thought that the situation in the case at hand, where a new Executive Order clearly
stripped away a severable portion of the former Order, was a rare one. Id. The court found that,
because the balancing provision of Executive Order No. 12,065 was set out in a separate section
called "Declassification Policy," it was severable from the classification procedures of that Order. Id.
236 Id. In fact, the court probably went out of its way to express its belief that such deference
ought to be paid to the Executive by the courts. See id. The distinctions that it drew from Lesar were
plausible, but far from convincing. The court could have followed Lesar, applied the criteria of
Executive Order No. 12,065, and found that the documents were properly classified. It could have
achieved the same result without explaining its decision in terms of deference to the Executive.
237 See supra notes 104-119 and accompanying text.
22€ Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hayden v. National Security Agency,
608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2c1 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(Wright, J., concurring).
239 Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The reason the agency's affidavits
often are not sufficiently detailed is that a complete description of the classified material will often
reveal the very material sought to be withheld. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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The power to inspect disputed documents in camera is a valuable tool for the promo-
tion of open information." 4 t It balances the inability of the plaintiff to argue fully for
disclosure against the need of the government to assure that the statutory exemptions will
not be circumvented merely by the filing of a suit by an aggrieved requester." 2 The
principal benefits achieved by the in camera procedure are the avoidance of misapplication
of a strictly-read exemption, 242
 the deterrent effect of impartial review upon an agency's
natural tendency to withhold documents, 2" and the enhanced "adversariness" of the
proceecling. 245
The express grant of power to order in camera inspection was designed to empower
courts to exercise "effective judicial review of executive branch classification decisions" in
order to rectify "the widespread over-use of classification stamps. "246 The legislative
history of the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA demonstrates that, despite the substantial
criticism of the in camera procedure,' Congress sought to facilitate in camera inspection of
document 5:24K
 Examination of the courts' response to this Congressional mandate, how-
241 1 O'REILLY, SUPTa note 8, at 8-44. See generally, R. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note
117, at 64-66; In Camera inspections, supra note 117, at 558-560.
"2 The Government's legitimate interests in secrecy could be destroyed if access to any docu-
ment could be obtained by the mere filing of a suit. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the
Government's protection of information see infra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
243
In camera inspection checks the potential abuse of the exemption-claims power by the
agencies. If an exemption were read strictly by the courts and the agency described
documents in a fashion tailored to adjust that description to the terms of precedents
interpreting that exemption, courts would not be able, without in camera powers to look
behind that agency's choice of descriptive terms.
1 O'REILLY, supra note 8, 8-50 n.14.
The Government has a bias toward classification. Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1210 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (Wright j., concurring). See supra notes 29-30. It may even have an improper motive for
concealing information such as covering up agency mistake, misconduct, or other embarrassments.
See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) ("It has been shown innumerable times that information is often withheld only to cover up
embarrassing mistakes  "); S WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 543 (1972) ("[C]lassification has frequently
served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administra-
tions."). See also Seven Year Assessment , supra note 21, at 935 ("The agencies' track record on disclosure,
both past and present, does not lend itself to commendation .... Confining judicial review to
non-substantive determinations [by refusing in camera power] . forecloses judicial redress for
meritorious complaint s.").
2" Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring). In camera
inspection at least provides a minimal substitute for true adversariness by allowing the court to test
the accuracy of the government's statements. Id.
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
' The most frequently raised objection to in camera inspection has been that judges lack the
knowledge and expertise to evaluate the effects of releasing allegedly sensitive material. See infra note
282 and accompanying text. Congress responded to this concern by noting that the reviewing court
would have the benefit of the Government's affidavits when making its in camera inspection, S. REP.
No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 167-168, and by expressing its
expectation that the reviewing court would accord "substantial weight" to agency affidavits reflecting
special knowledge or expertise. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2c•Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. 8C Au. NEWS, 6285, 6290. For a further discussion of the "substantial weight" language,
see iqi.a note 259-263 and accompanying text. Congress considered the fear of judicial incompe-
tence which was expressed by opponents to the in camera procedure to be unfounded. Letter front
Senator Kennedy and Representative Moorhead, Chairmen of the Conference Committee, to Presi-
dent Gerald R. Ford (Sept. 23, 1974), reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 381.
2" Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980); See also, Knopf' v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362,
May 1984] .	 SECURITY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE	 633
ever, reveals that the courts often limit their use of the in camera procedure out of
deference to the agency's affidavits.
In Weissman v. C.I.A.,"9 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the district court's decision to grant the agency's motion for summary
judgment, 2" rejecting the appellant's contention that the district court failed to follow
proper procedures by refusing to conduct an in camera inspection of documents before
sustaining the agency's claims of exernption. 291 The appellant, Weissman, asserted that an
in camera inspection was especially necessary because the agency's affidavits were not
sufficiently detailed to permit scrutiny of agency claims. 252 The appellate court was
probably correct in finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
summary judgment without inspecting in camera 252 because the FOIA grants district
courts broad discretion in their use of the in camera procedure. 294 The rule that the
appellate court articulated to guide district courts in their use of in camera inspection,
however, reveals its reluctance to conduct such an inspection out of deference to execu-
tive agencies,
The court held that a district court should conduct an in camera examination of
disputed documents "only where the record is vague or the agency claims too sweeping or
suggestive of had faith." 255
 In support of its holding, the court said that, "[flew judges
have the skill or exerience to weigh the repercussions of disclosure of intelligence
information. . . . In deciding whether to conduct an in camera inspection [the district
court] need not . . . test the expertise of the agency, or ... question its veracity when
nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith." 256
 The court went on to describe in
camera inspection as a "last resort." 297
In most of the cases following Weissman in which the federal courts have not con-
ducted an in camera inspection and have based their de novo determination upon the
Government's affidavits, the courts have relied upon language in the Conference Com-
mittee's Report on the 1974 Amendments 2r's for support. 299
 This language expressed the
1367 (1975) ("[The judge] now has a right . . . to require production of the document for his
inspection in camera."). Both the House and the Senate reported bills which would grant reviewing
courts liberal authority to employ in camera inspection. H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 6267; S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, p. 6267. See also 120 Cong. Rec. 1702'2-17023 (daily ed., May 30,
1974) for an important amendment added by Senator Muskie on the floor (placing the burden on the
agency to prove the propriety of its decision to withhold the information).
"' 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"" Id. at 698.
'Si Id. at 696.
Id.
'"` Id. at 698. The accuracy of the court's decision is difficult to ascertain because its opinion does
not discuss the affidavits in any detail. If appellant's assertion that the affidavits were inadequate is
correct, the district court's decision to grant summary judgment should be reversed.
Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
25' 565 F.2d at 698 (emphasis added).
2"6 Id. at 697.
2st Id.
S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
6285.
See Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 268 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Courts have long been
required to accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concurring (sic] national security
matters."); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 106-107 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The court
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Committee's expectation that the reviewing court would accord "substantial weight" to
agency affidavits reflecting special knowledge or expertise.' According to Judge Skelly
Wright, this language is a legitimate part of legislative history and "should influence the
courts to the extent that [it is] compatible with the fundamental directions on the face of
the statute itself." 2'° Judge Wright warned, however, that courts must recognize the limits
of the language: "Stretching the Conference Committee's recognition of the 'substantial
weight' deserved by demonstrated expertise and knowledge into a broad presumption
favoring all agency affidavits in national security cases would contradict the clear provi-
sions of the statute ...." 262
 An affidavit stating only in general or conclusory terms why the
agency has determined that the document should be exempt "should not and cannot be
accorded 'substantial weight' in a de novo proceeding." 263
 Those courts that view in camera
inspection as a last resort, therefore, may not support their deferential treatment of
agency affidavits with the Conference Committee's "substantial weight" language without
ignoring the fundamental intent of the 1974 amendments to the FO1A.
This is not 10 say that the vast majority of courts so limit their use of the in camera
procedure:26' Many courts, however, have not been examining the documents with the
frequency which Congress had anticipatec1 26' and which is arguably warranted by the
general inadequacy of agency affidavits. 21"' The reluctance of a significant number of
courts to inquire beyond insufficient affidavits, thus, presents evidence of deference to
the executive branch when determining the facts in national security cases. 27
must give 'substantial weight' to those affidavits."); Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328,
1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The court must accord 'substantial weight' to these affidavits."); Lesar v.
Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Tillie district court is to afford
'substantial weight' to the agency's affidavits.").
'" S. Rio'. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cone GONG. & AD.
NEWS, 6285, 6290. This language was designed to assuage President Ford's "unfounded" fears
without compromising the FOIA's provisions calling for de novo review with the burden on the
Government and permissive in camera inspection. See Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy and
Representative William S. Moorhead, Chairmen of the Conference Committee, to President Gerald
R. Ford (Sept. 23, 1974), reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 381; Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187,
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
"' Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
"..! Id.
263 Id.
264 See Porter v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 82-1833, slip op. (3d Cir. 1983); Dames & Moore v.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 544 F. Supp. 94, 96 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Larouche v. Kelley, 522 F.
Supp. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dunway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
National Catholic Reporter v. F.B.I., 514 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (D.D.C, 1981).
"5 See Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Judge Skelly Wright noted that
agency affidavits often fail to provide sufficient information for the court to make its de novo
determination.); S. REP. NO. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45,
at 182.
266 See Allen v. C.I.A., 636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2" One court has said:
Congress did not intend that the courts would make a true de novo review of classified
documents, that is a fresh determination of the legitimacy of the classification status....
Rather, Congress intended that the courts would review the sufficiency of the agency's
affidavits and require the agency to come forward with more ... if the affidavits proved
insufficient... .
The court is in no position to second-guess either the agency's determination of the
need for classification or the agency's prediction of harm should release be permitted.
Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1253-54 (7th Gin 1981). But see infra notes 342-347.
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Although judicial deference to the executive is perhaps more readily apparent at the
first Iwo stages of review, such deference is probably most prevalent at the third stage. As
noted above, ninny courts do fulfill t heir dunes at the first two steps of de novo review.'"
The fact that no alleged national security information of any significance has been
disclosed as a result of FOIA litigation, however, suggests that these courts are not
pursuing de novo review to its conclusion.
A court's assessment of the requested documents in light of the relevant legal criteria
is most likely the step at which the deferential treatment of executive decisions is most
prevalent,'" 9 but least detectable."" Examination of a court's application of' law to facts in
national security cases is difficult because of the nature of the proceeding. The informa-
tion in the public record is limited. Much of the important information is presented in
camera, and the court's reasoning in support of its decision is necessarily lacking in detail.
Although the court is required to provide t he plaintiff with sufficient information so that
he may develop an appeal,' this requirement is still restricted by the fact that much of
the information necessary to explain the decision is classified and cannot be disclosed.
The court's task at the final stage of de nova review in national security cases is to
review agency compliance with the criteria of the relevant Executive Order. 7" The court
must decide whether the information has been classified in accordance with the pro-
cedural requirements of the relevant Order, and whether it actually falls within the
substantive classification categories claimed by the agency. 273 Both the procedural and
substantive criteria must be satisfied. 274
Under the current Executive Order," 5 the court's application of the substantive
criteria is essentially a two-step process. L7" The court must first determine whether the
hheld material meets the threshold requirement set forth in E.O. 12356. If the court
finds that the material "concerns""7 one or more of the ten enumerated categories, then
the material "shall be considered for classification." 278 This initial determination is quite
straightforward, but if there is any ambiguity regarding whether a document "concerns"
one of the categories, the FOIA requires that it be resolved in favor of disclosure." 9
sag
	 supra note 264.
2" Despite the fact that many courts fulfill their duties at the first two stages of review, virtually
no information has been disclosed as a result of FOIA litigation. See .supra note 217 and accompany-
ing text. This suggests that the courts' application of the legal criteria to the facts is the crucial stage
where their duties are not being fulfilled.
27" See Ray v. Turner, 587' F.2d 1187, 1205, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring).
Z 7 ' See id. at 1192.
2" See supra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
27' See 5 U.S:C. § 552(b)(1); Assessment, supra note 137, at 96.
2 " See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
2" Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.E.R. 166 (1983). See supra notes 178-203 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Executive Order No. 12,356.
27' Id. The Order enumerates ten categories of information which shall be considered for
classification.
" 7 Executive Order No. 12,356's use of the word "concerns - in § 1.3 is yet another example of
the use of broad and vague language which enables agencies to classify at will. Exec. Order No.
12,356, 3 C.E.R. 166, 168-69 (1983). Cf. Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 7 (discusses the
vague and general Language of Executive Order No. 12,356).
"" Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3, 3 C.F.R. 166, 168-69 (1983).
279 See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, J., concurring). The
resolution of ambiguity concerning the Government's failure to carry its burden of proving that the
material clearly concerns one of the enumerated categories must be distinguished from the resolu-
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The second step of the court's application of the substantive criteria to the facts is, in
contrast to the first, not at all clear-cut. if the information is found to concern one of the
catergories in step one, the court must determine whether disclosure of the information
"reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security,"28( ' Although the
standard is indefinite and its application may be difficult, Congress has made clear its
intent that the court make these judgments."' The courts must have full power of review
so as to provide a check on the exercise of executive classification authority.'"'' In the
words of Senator Muskie, "Government classifiers must be subject to some impartial
review. If courts cannot have full latitude to conduct the review, no one can." 28"
The judiciary, however, has refrained from making these judgments out of defer-
ence to the executive branch.'" They have even excused procedural errors where the
Government has satisfactorily shown the substantive propriety of its decision to classify a
document. 285 The judiciary's reluctance to review de novo the agencies' substantive deci-
sions is a product of the courts' recognition of the inherently speculative nature of
predicting the degree of harm to the national security which may result from the
disclosure of certain information:286 The courts have noted that to demand more than a
plausible demonstration that the predicted danger is a reasonable expectation would be
"overstepping by large measure the proper role of a court in a national security FOIA
case." 2" The proper role of the court, however, is to make a thorough de novo determina-
tion of whether the predicted danger is a reasonable expectation. 2m The court's accep-
tion of ambiguity concerning the question of whether the material actually concerns one of the
enumerated categories. Where there is reasonable doubt whether the agency has shown that the
material should clearly be classified, the FOIA's policy in favor of disclosure must guide the courts'
determination. On the other hand, where there is reasonable doubt whether the material should be
classified, the Executive policy favoring classification must control. Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(c), 3
C.F.R. 166, 167 (1983) ("if there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be
safeguarded as if it were classified . .").
n'} Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983).
2
" 1 See supra note 44 and accompanying text,
282 See 120 CONG. REG. H6813 (daily ed., Mar. 14, 1974). It has been suggested that because of
the courts' lack of experience in matters of national security, the courts are limited to a determination
that the documents fit into one of the enumerated categories, that they have in fact been classified in
accordance with the proper procedure, and that there is a logical nexus between the information at
issue and the claimed exemption. Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir.
1981). Proponents of this view say that the courts are in no position to second-guess the agency's
prediction of the harm that would result from disclosure. See Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Halperin v. C,1.A., 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). "Even in those
instances where the court might have its own view of the soundness of the original policy decision, it
must defer to the agency's evaluation of the need to maintain the secrecy of the [information at
issue]." Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981).
120 CONG. REC. 517023 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
2" See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
2"s
	 e.g., Baez v. Department of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[A]lthough
procedural and substantive conformity ... is required by the terms of the statute, the consequences
of a particular defect may differ." Because no agency bad faith was found, the validity of agency
decision to classify was not affected by the procedural impropriety.); Lesar v. Department of Justice,
636 F.2d 472, 483-484 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (belated classification of the documents was an "atypical
slip-up" which did not undermine the claimed exemption).
2" Halperin v. C.I.A., 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court deferred to agency affidavits
due to its lack of expertise in dealing with matters of national security).
2
" 7 Id. at 149.
2" See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in Source Book, supra note 45, at 183.
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lance of a "plausible" showing by the Government does not comply with Congress' intent
that they make a de novo determination."'" The FOIA empowers the judiciary to make
such a determination, and the courts should exercise this power in order to provide a
check on executive classification authority,? The deference which the courts presently
accord the judgment of the executive branch, however, does not allow (hem to perform
their intended role. The courts' unwillingness to question the judgment of the executive
agencies prevents them from making a true de novo determination.
The high degree of deference accorded the judgment of the executive branch has
thus seriously limited the scope of de novo review in national security FO1A litigation.
Nonetheless, even such a limited review has furthered the purposes of the Act to some
extent. Until recently," 91 the provisions for judicial review have had a curious prophylactic
effect. The prospect of having to justify classification decisions before a neutral arbiter
seems to have forced agencies to he more thorough in their search for requested docu-
ments and more objective in their classification determinations.'" The fact that the
Government would have to go into court with affidavits and specify in detail the harm that
would result led the Government to release information which, prior to the Amendments
of the FOIA, it would not have released.'" In Ray v. Turner,'" for example, only after sun
was brought, with the concomitant threat of in camera inspection, did the CIA, which had
twice before found no disclosable portions among the requested materials, 2" eventually
discover that there were indeed segregable portions. 2" Furthermore, it was only under
the specific threat of plaintiff's motion for in camera inspection that the CIA submitted a
supplemental affidavit which, although still insufficient, provided more detailed descrip-
tions of the withheld docurnents."7 The overriding policy of the FO1A, especially as
expressed through its broad provisions for review, had thus created greated voluntary
agency compliance with the FOIA, even though it has not resulted in effective judicial
enforcement.
This section's examination of the courts' performance of their role under the FOIA
has revealed that the courts' deference to executive classification decisions has prevented
them from effectively enforcing the FOIA. Section 11/ 2" will examine the problems which
the judiciary's failure creates for the FOIA in light of President Reagan's E.O. 12356. It
will also discuss the available solutions to these problems, all of which require an active
judiciary.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOIA
In order to achieve the goals of the FOIA in national security cases, the classification
power of government agencies should not go unchecked. It' the executive exercised
unchecked classification power, the balance sought to be achieved by the FOIA would be
282 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright J., concurring).
2" See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
291 That is, prior to Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
292 Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 51; Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245,
1254 (7th Cir. 1981).
2" See id.
284 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
295 Id. at 1212 n.51.
296 Id.
291 Id.
298 See infra notes 300-349 and accompanying text.
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disrupted, and the public's right of access to government information would not be
effectively protected. Congress provided for a check on the agencies' classification power
by empowering the federal courts to review the procedural and substantive propriety of
government classification decisions.'" As noted previously, however, the courts, out of
deference to the agencies' decisions, have been reluctant to conduct a de novo review and
enjoin those decisions which it finds to be improper. The courts' reluctance is all the more
damaging to the FO1A's efforts to protect the public's rights in light of the current
Executive Order on national security information.'""'
As noted earlier, President Reagan's E.O. 12356 places heavy emphasis on the need
for the protection of government information."' The Reagan administration's attempts
to protect information are not without merit. Secrecy allows for candor in foreign
relations, permits flexibility in negotiations with foreign governments, and allows for the
expression of internal opposition without fragmenting governmental policy." 2 Maintain-
ing secrecy in government, however, presents serious dangers to a democracy. Withhold-
ing information vests unchecked control in the executive, creates a credibility gap be-
tween government and the governed, and provides the Government with an opportunity
to use "leaks" to disclose only as much information as it deems useful.'" These are just
the sort of clangers which the FOIA seeks to avert by protecting the public's right of access
to government information."' The judiciary's failure to perform its role in the FOIA,
however, inhibits the FO1A's ability to achieve this goal.
President Reagan's Executive Order presents two problems for the FOIA in regard
to national security information which, when combined with the judiciary's failure to
provide a check on executive power, may he fatal to t he achievement of the ultimate goals
of the Act. That the difficulties posed by E.O. 12356 will prevent the FOIA from
achieving its goal is not a foregone conclusion. The solutions to both difficulties, however,
require the courts' exercise of their authority to enforce the FOIA.
The first problem presented by E.O. 12356 is that the present Executive Order
encourages agencies to err in favor of more classification. 3{15 Such encouragement indi-
rectly results from E.O. 12356's provision that any reasonable doubts about whether a
document should be classified shall be resolved in favor of classification." 6 The provision
articulates an unambiguous policy favoring increased classification."' This problem could
be directly eliminated by t he judiciary's assertion of its power to enforce the MIA.'
" See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 178-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current Executive
Order.
'"" See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1469.
. 0.I For a general discussion of the costs and benefits of open government, see Franck &
Weisband, Executive Secrecy in Three Democracies: The Parameters of Reform, in SECRECY IN FOREIGN'
Youcv 3 (T. Franck & Weisband eds. 1974).
"" See supra note 3.
""' See 128 CONG. REC. 54213 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston) ("The aim
[of Executive Order 123561 appears to he to try to make it easier for Government agencies to classify
in formation."); .supra note 185 and accompanying text.
"" Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 167 (1983).
See 128 CONG. REC. 54213 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston) (Executive
Order 12356 enables agencies to classify information "without having to think carefully about why
disclosure might damage national security"); supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 205-297 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Judiciary's role.
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It seems fairly evident that when agencies, which are basically inclined to err on the
side of protecting their secrets, are ordered to err on the side of protecting secrets, they will
quickly abandon the somewhat more careful and thoughtful classification practices which
developed in response to the 1974 Amendments and President Carter's E.O. 12065. 3°9
Consequently, more information will be classified, and much of this additional classifica-
tion is likely to be improper.'" Under E.O. 12356, agencies are no longer guided by a
joint Congressional and Executive mandate to disclose when possible. Instead they have
executive orders to follow their basic inclination and classify when possible.
In light. of E.O. 12356, the ability of the FOIA to protect the public's right of access to
government information depends heavily upon the courts' determination to review
agency classification decisions and enjoin those that are improper. The courts' active
enforcement of the FOIA would directly address the problem of improper classification
created by E.O. 12356. If classifying personnel knew that their decisions would be
subjected to a thorough de novo review and enjoined if found to he improper, they would
be inclined to make their decisions thoughtfully and carefully,'"' As a result, more
information would be disclosed by the agencies themselves. The criteria of E.O. 12356
would still apply because the FOIA does not authorize the courts to decide whether the
executive's criteria are proper.'" 2
 The courts, however, may require that all classified
documents actually satisfy these criteria, substantively and procedurally, and that the
Government bear the burden of proving its compliance with the criteria.
The second problem presented by E.O. 12356 is more difficult to resolve than the
first, and it arises directly from the operative provisions of E.O. 12356. The present
Order's criteria are so broad' as to enable agencies to withhold almost any information
that they want. Furthermore, the agencies are not required to consider the public's
interest in disclosure when making their classification decisions."A As a result, more
information will be classified and the public's right of access to government information
will be inhibited. E.O. 12356 thus disrupts the balance of public and governmental
interests sought to he maintained by the FOIA. 11 '
The FOIA's provision for judicial review attempts to balance the competing interests
of the public and the government., but E.O. 12356 poses a .significant challenge to this
attempt. It diminishes the effectiveness of de nova review as a means of protecting the
"" Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 50-51.
'II° 128 CONC. REC. 54213 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston) (Executive
Order 12356 creates "the serious danger of overclassification and excessive secrecy in Govern-
ment."). See also supra note 154.
"" A healthy skepticism about information practices and policies created the de novo review
requirement in the statute, and skepticism among the courts forces agencies to carefully monitor the
invocation of the exemptions. 1 O'REnd.v, supra note 8, at 3-23.
" 15 "1- he court would only review the [classified] material to see if it conformed with the
[Executive Order's classification' criteria. The description 'in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy' is descriptive of the area that the criteria have been estab-
lished in [sic] but does not give the court the power to review the criteria.
120 CONC. REC. H681 1 (daily ed., Mar. 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn). See also 120 CONC.
REC. H34167 (daily ed., Oct. 7, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead) ("A court could only determine
whether the information was 'properly classified' pursuant to [the) Executive Order,"); 120 CoNG.
REC. H6813 (daily ed., Mar. 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Mink) (courts will be able to rule only on
classification within the criteria).
" 1 " See Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 75.
'10 See supra note 203.
" See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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public's right of access by establishing more categories of classifiable information," s by
eliminating the "identifiable damage" requirement from the threshold standard for
classification,"" and by resolving all doubts in favor of classification:"
Under E.O. 12356's predecessor, E.O. 12065, the agency had to prove that disclosure
of a classified document would, at a minimum, be reasonably expected to cause "iden-
tifiable damage" to national security: 39 Furthermore, E.O. 12065 required that any
reasonable doubts concerning the propriety of classification be decided in favor of
disclosure:129 In contrast, E.O. 12356 requires only proof that disclosure would rea-
sonably be expected to cause damage to national security." 2 ' If no particular damage
needs to be identified, the "damage" which t he classifying agency predicts will result from
the document's disclosure may be only a theoretical damage." 22 As a result, justifying a
classification decision is substantially easier under E.O. 12356. 32"
Furthermore, the criteria under which the court must assess the classification deci-
sion provide that reasonable doubts be resolved in favor of classification. 324 This provision
makes the agency's task of meeting the burden of proof significantly easier. Whereas
under E.O. 12065 agencies were required to show that a document was clearly exempt
from disclosure," 2" under E.O. 12356 agencies need only show that there is a reasonable
doubt about whether the document is exempt: 126 This provision thus forces the party
requesting disclosure to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the document is not
exempt. Because the plaintiff typically has little or no information pertaining to the
reasons why the document is classified, it is virtually impossible for him to meet this
burden."' Congress recognized this problem when it enacted the FOIA, and as a result,
placed the burden on the Government to sustain its action: 128 E.O. 12356 alters the
statutory scheme of the FOIA and prevents the Act from effectively protecting the
public's right of access to information. 329
These provisions create a serious problem for the FOIA. 33° Even if the federal courts
conduct the type of review which Congress had intended, their review may not reveal
much, if any, departure from the criteria set forth in E.O. 12356. 31 Because the courts
are not empowered to review the propriety of the Executive Order, the solution to the
'' See supra note 313.
317 See supra note 188.
I" Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(c), 3 C.F.R.	 166, 167 (1983).
319 Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-103, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (1978).
' 2" Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-101, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,950 (1978).
' 121 Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983).
:121 See Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 3 -4.
32.' See 128 CONG. REC. 54213 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. fluddlesion).
"" Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(c), 3 C.F.R. 166, 167 (1983).
525 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright J., concurring).
""' See supra notes 183-186 and accompaning text.
"" See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
"" Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
121 128 Coxe. REC. 54212 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Leahy) ("shifting the
burden to the public will have the inevitable effect of upsetting the balance and giving Government
its natural advantages in the fight for access.").
'111 See supra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
231 The criteria of Exec. Order No. 12,356 are so classification-oriented that an agency
would be able to justify its classification of almost any information. See Classification Hearings, supra
note 27, at 14.
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problem which E.O. 12356 creates is not wholly in the hands of the judiciary. The 1:01A
itself must be adapted to meet the problems created by E.O. 12356." 2
Although Congress has not yet enacted any corrective legislation, Senator Duren-
berger of Minnesota and six other senators have proposed a bill which would address the
Reagan Administration's efforts to diminish t he effectiveness of the FOIA.""' This pro-
posal would amend the national security exemption to require that even properly
classified information can be wit hheld from the public under the FO1A only when the
disclosure of the information "could reasonably be expected to cause indentifiable harm
to national security" and "when the need to protect information outweighs the public
interest in disclosure."'" Through the amendment, t he Senators seek to incorporate into
the Act the "balancing" and "identifiable damage" provisions of E.O. 12065 which were
revoked by F..0.12356."'
Such a legislative solution would restore the effectiveness of de nova review."" By
amending the criteria of the national security exemption, the bill imposes a statutory
restraint upon the executive's power to establish criteria."' The additional criteria would
limit agency discretion so that the burden of proof which the agencies must satisfy would
be substantial enough to favor t he party seeking disclosure, as Congress originally in-
tended."'
The bill's success in restoring the balance of public and governmental interests which
is disrupted by E.O. 12356, however, depends heavily upon the courts. If the courts do
not conduct a de novo review and require the agencies to show t hat their decisions comply
with these additional criteria, the stricter criteria will not succeed in restoring the hal-
ance.'°° Indeed, one authority, in commenting upon the effect that E.O. 12356 would
have on the FOIA, has said that the revocation of the "identifiable damage" and "balanc-
ing" provisions of E.O. 12356 was unlikely to affect the operation of the FOIA because no
court decisions have relied on or even discussed these provisions."" No decision has
considered these provisions, perhaps, because no court has undertaken a de nova review
and applied them without deferring to the agency's claim that they have been satisfied.
The proposed bill re-emphasizes Congress' belief that judicial review is necessary to
:"12 To the extent that the Executive's power to determine the criteria for the national security
exemption allows him to manipulate the scope of the exemption, Congress may respond with further
amendments. 1 O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 11-10 n.3.
"'" 5.2452, introduced on April 28, 1982. 128 Coxc. RE.c. S4210-S4216. (No action was taken on
the bill during the 97th Congress.).
334 id .
"'" Although the Senators did not directly incorporate the provisions of Executive Order No.
12,065, the language of these provisions comes directly from Exec. Order No. 12,065 §§ 3-303,
1-303, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,955, 28,952 (1978).
":"' Contra Assessment, supra note 137, at 96 n.42 ("Given the seemingly relative insignificance of
the modifier, 'identifiable,' in terms of burden of proof in F.O.I. Act cases, the bill appears to be more
of a signal to agency classifiers than an alteration of the standards of judicial review in F.O.I. Act
cases involving exemption one.").
"" This bill, however, may not go far enough. Executive Order No. 12,356's mandate to resolve
all doubts in favor of classification creates a powerful policy which remains untouched by the
proposed legislation.
"" See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
"" 5 Under the bill, the courts are not empowered to review the agency's application of the
balancing test. 128 CONG. REC. S4212 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982). They may only ask whether the test
was made. Id.
340 Classification Hearings, supra note 27, at 75.
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the proper operation of the FOIA. Instead of proposing a bill which would seriously
intrude into the executive's authority in national security cases and possibly create a
separation of powers problem,'" the Senators chose to make the criteria for judicial
review stricter and thereby return to the courts the power to enjoin improper
classifications. The courts, by exercising this power,- will thus be able to maintain the
balance between the public's interest in disclosure and t he Government's interest in the
protection of information. The maintenance of this balance is necessary to the success of
the FOIA, and the judiciary's acceptance of its responsibility to review executive classifica-
tion decisions is necessary to the maintenance of this balance.
The proposed bill also emphasizes Congress' belief' that the courts are competent to
decide issues of national security.' Prohahly the reason most often cited for the courts'
reluctance to conduct a thorough de novo review of an executive agency's classification
decision is that the courts are not competent to decide matters of national security.d 4 "
Agencies admittedly have more experience and expertise in matters of national security
than the courts. The role of the courts, however, is not to usurp the function of an agency
chief, but to weigh the strength of his arguments against those of the litigant requesting
disclosure and determine whether the former has properly exercised his authority under
the relevant law, a44
Congress was aware of the judiciary's lack of expertise in matters of national security
when it passed the FO1A Amendments, but it did not find the problem insurmount-
able. 345 The Senate Judiciary Committee specifically concluded that the courts are qual-
ified to make the necessary judgments.` t" The committee also suggested that courts
'"' The separation of powers argument is also advanced in opposition to the courts' de novo
review and to enjoin classification decisions. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. H36243-H36244 (1974) (veto
message of President Ford). It is based upon the idea that the Executive can only function effectively
in an area committed to him by the Constitution, like national security, if he can operate undisturbed
by the other branches. See id.; Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1466-1467. This doctrine,
however, does not require that the Executive exercise unchecked power in the area of national
security. Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1467. The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the
integrity of the three branches of government and to ensure each branch's independence. See Myers
v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 291-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). it does not require absolute deference
to the Executive's decisions to withhold documents that do not contain diplomatic or military secrets.
See Developments in the Law —The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. t.. REV. 1130,
1219 (1972). J. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d. 788, 793-94 {D.C.
Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the separation of powers argument advanced by President Ford in
opposition to the Amended FOIA (Veto Message, 120 Coxc. REC. 36243 - 36244 (1974)), see 120
CONC. REC. 539602 (daily ed., Nov. 19, 1974) (letters from Philip B. Kurland to Senator Muskie
(Nov. 15, 1974)).
In its provision for judicial review of Executive decisions, Congress did not intrude upon the
Executive's power. The FOIA does not empower the courts to review the propriety of the Executive's
criteria for classification; it merely authorizes review of agency compliance with those criteria. See
infra note 349.
' 1" See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
"4" In Epstein v. Resor, the court said, "the question of what is desirable in the interest of
national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of question that courts are designed to deal with."
Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1976). Similarly, in Salisbury v. U.S., the court said that,
"[judges lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in the typical national
security FOIA case; they must not . . . conduct a detailed inquiry to decide whether (they] agree [ ]
with the agency's opinions." Salisbury v. U.S., 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
"" See Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1465.
aas See id. at 1449 - 50.
"The judgments involved may often be delicate and difficult ones, but someone other than
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employ special masters or expert consultants to aid them in making what may often be
sophisticated determinations.' 4 i
Courts are frequently called upon to make difficult judgments on complex sub-
jects.'" With no special expertise in business, economics, physics, or engineering, courts
resolve intricate factual disputes in corporate, antitrust, environmental, and patent cases.
They can perform t he same function when national security issues arise in classification
cases. In such cases, the court is only required to examine the executive decision in terms
of the executive's own criteria.""
CONCLUSION
The courts can provide the best forum for examining the issues raised by national
security claims. Judges are insulated from the political arena and can mediate between
government claims and public demands. °'0 De novo determinations of the propriety of
executive classification decisions would ensure that the national security is protected
without sacrificing the public's right of access to government records." 5 '
Effective judicial enforcement of the FOlA is thus essential to the successful opera-
tion of the Act in regard to national security information. The judiciary's exercise of its
powers of review is necessary to the success of the FO1A, which seeks to maintain a
balance between the public interest in disclosure and the governmental interest in the
protection of information. The maintenance of this balance requires that each branch of
the federal government perform its assigned role. The judiciary's role is especially
important to maintaining this balance in regard to national security information because
the national security exemption vests broad power in the executive branch. This redis-
tribution of power upsets the balance, and in order to restore it, the courts must provide a
check on executive power by reviewing the executive agencies' classification decisions.
At present, however, the judiciary does not provide this check on executive power.
Courts are deferential to the judgment of the executive agencies, and as a consequence,
hey do not conduct the de nava review that the FOIA's statutory scheme requires of them.
The judiciary's failure to perform its assigned role disrupts the balance which is necessary
to the success of the FOIA and leaves the public's right of access to government informa-
tion inadequately protected.
Scorr A. FAUST
interested parties — officials with power to classify and conceal information — must he empowered
to make them. It is the committee's conclusion that the courts are qualified to make such judgments."
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974), reprinted in Source Book supra note 45, at 183.
347 Id.
"" See Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1472.
3" See 120 CONG. REC. H6808 (daily ed., Mar 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); Clark,
supra note 3, at 758-59 (Judiciary is only empowered to require executive agencies to comply with the
standards).
:"' Note, Right to Know, supra note 34, at 1473.
35 ' Id.
